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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 __________________ 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Plaintiffs Alphonse W. Groman and Jane M. Groman appeal 
the district court's grant of summary judgment on their civil 
rights claims to defendants Township of Manalapan, the 
Englishtown-Manalapan First Aid Squad, members of the first aid 
squad and Manalapan Police Department, and several unknown 
defendants. 
 The dispute arises out of the arrest of Mr. Groman at 
his residence on February 17, 1990.  Plaintiffs brought this 
civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), alleging 
certain constitutional violations based on: use of excessive 
force, false arrest, false imprisonment, failure to provide 
necessary medical treatment, unlawful search and seizure, 
conspiracy to violate constitutional rights, and denial of right 
to counsel.1 
 The district court granted summary judgment to all 
defendants on all constitutional claims and declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction on the state law claims.  We will 
affirm on all counts except the claim of excessive force against 
police officers Helen K. Kirkland, Matthew Trembow, and Peter 
                     
1
.   Plaintiffs also alleged the following state law claims: 
trespassing, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, assault, battery, loss of consortium, invasion of 
privacy, injury to good name and reputation, slander, libel, 
negligent hiring, and failure properly to train and supervise. 
  
Vanderweil, and the claims of false arrest and false imprisonment 
against police officer Kirkland. 
 
 I. 
 On February 17, 1990, Alphonse W. Groman and his wife, 
Jane M. Groman, were in their home in Manalapan, New Jersey, when 
Mr. Groman, age seventy-five, allegedly suffered a minor stroke.  
Mrs. Groman telephoned her neighbor, James W. Thomson, who came 
over with his son, James E. Thomson, and then called the police 
for first aid.  Officer Helen K. Kirkland of the Township of 
Manalapan Police Department was the first to respond. 
 When Kirkland arrived at the Groman residence, James W. 
Thomson and Mrs. Groman were attempting to place Mr. Groman into 
a chair.  Kirkland entered the room and proceeded toward Mr. 
Groman, who resisted her contact and demanded to go outside.  Mr. 
Groman admitted to consuming one alcoholic drink sometime 
earlier. 
  Exactly what happened next is hotly contested.  
Plaintiffs contend Mr. Groman was standing still, arms to his 
side, when Kirkland struck him in the mouth.  This blow, 
plaintiffs maintain, was an unprovoked assault against a small 
elderly man, who, while uncooperative, did not deserve to be 
struck.2  Defendants assert Kirkland put a hand on Groman's 
                     
2
.   Mrs. Groman's testimony at deposition included the following 
exchange: 
 
 Q: And what happened after you got the chair 
out? 
 
  
shoulder in an effort to get him to sit down.  Immediately 
thereafter Groman punched Kirkland in the face, cutting and 
bruising her cheek, and began using abusive language.  As he 
prepared to hit her again, Kirkland responded out of fear for her 
own safety and hit Groman.  She observed that Groman was 
combative and that he smelled of alcohol.3  According to 
(..continued) 
 A: I was watching [Mr. Groman] all this time.  
As I say, I backed away, and Officer Kirkland 
looked at [Mr. Groman] and said to him, Do 
you know you hit an officer? 
 
 Q: Okay. 
 
 A: This is when I came forward with--I guess 
my mouth must have been opened ready to say 
he didn't touch you, because [Mr. Groman] was 
just standing there, his head down a bit, his 
arms to his side, he didn't move an inch, and 
there was no way in hell that he could have 
hit her. 
 
Jane Groman Dep., Plaintiffs' App. at 375. 
3
.   Kirkland testified at Groman's state trial to the following: 
 
 Q: What happened after [Mr. Groman] hit you? 
 
 A: Well, it seemed that we were going to--he 
was going to hit me again.  I hit the subject 
back and then I grabbed both his hands with 
mine and locked them, and he got up, and he 
was--it was like he was going to fight me 
again.  So I held his hands just like--almost 
like a kid, up in the air, and he was trying 
to bend my hands back . . . .  
 
Kirkland Test., Plaintiffs' App. at 120.  Kirkland also 
testified: 
 
 Q: Did Mr. Groman do anything beyond his 
striking you that you testified to, ma'am, to 
put you in such fear of your safety? 
 
 . . . . 
  
plaintiffs, Groman was a stroke victim, disoriented and a bit 
aggressive, who was assaulted by a police officer dispatched to 
assist him.  Defendants portray Groman as a violent drunk and 
claim Kirkland's response was the appropriate reaction to a 
dangerous situation. 
 Kirkland called the Manalapan Police Department for 
backup.  Officer Matthew Trembow soon arrived to aid Kirkland and 
the local first aid squad arrived shortly thereafter, followed by 
Lieutenant Peter Vanderweil.  Members of the first aid squad 
attempted to provide medical assistance to Groman but he rebuffed 
them.  Groman continued to be belligerent and to curse at the 
police and first aid squad.  The first aid squad members left 
without treating him.   
 The police officers proceeded to arrest Groman, but he 
was not cooperative.  After a brief struggle which plaintiffs 
attribute to Groman's limited mobility in his right arm and 
defendants to Groman's attempt to resist arrest, the officers 
placed Groman in handcuffs.  As the police took Groman out to the 
police car, he allegedly sustained an injury to his face and lost 
his dentures. 
 Upon arrival at the police station, the officers 
removed Groman from the car.  Here again the parties vigorously 
dispute what occurred.  Plaintiffs maintain, based on Groman's 
(..continued) 
 
 A: At this time he had started to stand up, 
and he had had his fist cocked back again. 
 
Kirkland Dep., Plaintiffs' App. at 752. 
  
hazy recollection, that the police officers dragged Groman out of 
the car feet first causing his head to hit the pavement.  After 
picking him up, the officers stomped on his toe, allowed him to 
fall again, and then one of the officers jumped on him.  
Defendant police officers say that as they moved Groman from the 
police car to the station he fell, knocking his head against the 
ground, and that Kirkland lost her balance trying to hold Groman 
up and fell with him.  Once inside the police station, plaintiffs 
contend the officers left Groman handcuffed for some time.  The 
first aid squad was called again, but Groman again refused 
treatment.  Groman's daughter asserts his pants were doused in 
alcohol when she picked him up from the police station.  
Plaintiffs maintain that during the course of these events Groman 
sustained black eyes and minor cuts and bruises to the face and 
hands.  The police charged Groman with aggravated assault, 
disorderly conduct, and resisting arrest.  He was acquitted on 
all counts after a bench trial in the Manalapan Township 
Municipal Court. 
 
 II. 
 We exercise plenary review over the grant of a motion 
for summary judgment.  Oritani Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fidelity & 
Deposit Co., 989 F.2d 635, 637 (3d Cir. 1993).  We apply the same 
test required of the district court, viewing the facts from the 
evidence submitted in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party, and taking the non-movant's allegations as true.  Goodman 
v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. 
  
denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).  We have jurisdiction over this 
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988). 
 Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c).  After one party has filed a properly supported summary 
judgment motion, the party opposing it must present sufficient 
evidence for a reasonable jury to find in its favor.  Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-52 (1986).  The party 
contesting the motion must demonstrate a dispute over facts that 
might affect the outcome of the suit.  Id. at 248.  Plaintiffs 
contend they have presented sufficient evidence to survive  
summary judgment. 
 
  
 III. 
 Section 1983 of 42 U.S.C.4 does not create substantive 
rights, but provides a remedy for the violation of rights created 
by federal law.  Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 
(1985).  A prima facie case under § 1983 requires a plaintiff to 
demonstrate: (1) a person deprived him of a federal right; and 
(2) the person who deprived him of that right acted under color 
of state or territorial law.  Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 
(1980). 
A.  Claims Against the Police 
 An excessive force claim under § 1983 arising out of 
law enforcement conduct is based on the Fourth Amendment's 
protection from unreasonable seizures of the person.  Graham v. 
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989).  A cause of action exists 
under § 1983 when a law enforcement officer uses force so 
excessive that it violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution.  Brown v. Borough of 
                     
4
.   The text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in part: 
 
 § 1983.  Civil action for deprivation of 
rights 
  Every person who, under color of any 
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes 
to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of 
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable 
to the party injured in an action at law, 
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding 
for redress. . . .  
  
Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 277 (3d Cir. 1990).  Police officers 
are privileged to commit a battery pursuant to a lawful arrest, 
but the privilege is negated by the use of excessive force.  
Edwards v. City of Phila., 860 F.2d 568, 572 (3d Cir. 1988).   
 When a police officer uses force to effectuate an 
arrest that force must be reasonable.  Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.  
The reasonableness of the officer's use of force is measured by 
"careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each 
particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, 
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of 
the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting 
arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight."  Id.  The 
reasonableness inquiry is objective, but should give appropriate 
scope to the circumstances of the police action, which are often 
"tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving."  Id. at 397.  
 In this case, summary judgment is appropriate if, as a 
matter of law, the evidence would not support a reasonable jury 
finding that the police officers' actions were objectively 
unreasonable.  Without commenting on the weight of the evidence, 
we believe it could support a finding that Kirkland hit Groman 
when Groman was suffering from a minor stroke, and that Groman's 
obstreperous behavior did not warrant Kirkland's reaction.  We 
conclude there are material issues of disputed fact, and that a 
jury could decide that Kirkland and the other officers acted 
unreasonably and used excessive force.  Further, a jury could 
find the officers used excessive force in transporting Groman to 
the police station.  
  
 Should a jury decide Groman did not hit Kirkland, then 
he could have committed only the crimes of disorderly conduct and 
resisting arrest.  In evaluating the Graham factors under the 
facts of this case, we conclude that neither offense is 
particularly severe, and that a jury could determine Groman did 
not present a serious threat to Kirkland.  Cf. Frohmader v. 
Wayne, 958 F.2d 1024, 1025-26 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding summary 
judgment on excessive force claim inappropriate when plaintiff's 
sworn account differed from police officer's regarding events 
after plaintiff's arrest); Wing v. Britton, 748 F.2d 494, 495-96 
(8th Cir. 1984) (jury decided excessive force claim when disputed 
fact was whether plaintiff punched police officer to provoke 
officer's response). 
 In sum, we hold only that there are material issues of 
disputed fact and credibility determinations that cannot be 
decided on a motion for summary judgment.5  We will reverse the 
district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs' 
excessive force claim against officers Helen K. Kirkland, Matthew 
Trembow, and Peter Vanderweil.6  
                     
5
.   This case is distinct from Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 
903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990), in which we affirmed the 
district court's holding that plaintiff's claim was frivolous 
because it was based on plaintiff's bare assertion of police 
excessive force, was completely uncorroborated by other evidence, 
and plaintiff's recollection was dimmed by alcohol.  Here, there 
is some corroboration from Mrs. Groman on the initial altercation 
and from others on the injuries sustained. 
6
.   Of course, the fact that we reverse as to officers Trembow 
and Vanderweil does not put them in the same posture as Kirkland 
on remand.  Plaintiffs do not allege Trembow and Vanderweil were 
involved in the initial scrap where Kirkland hit Groman in the 
house.  Thus, plaintiffs will have to prove that Trembow and 
  
 Our holding on the excessive force claim does not 
automatically compel reversal of the grant of summary judgment on 
plaintiffs' other claims against the police.  To prevail on their 
false arrest claim, plaintiffs would have to demonstrate at trial 
that the police lacked probable cause to arrest Groman.  "The 
proper inquiry in a section 1983 claim based on false arrest 
. . . is not whether the person arrested in fact committed the 
offense but whether the arresting officers had probable cause to 
believe the person arrested had committed the offense."  Dowling 
v. City of Phila., 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988).  Groman was 
charged with aggravated assault,7 disorderly conduct,8 and 
(..continued) 
Vanderweil violated Groman's Fourth Amendment rights by using 
excessive force during his transport to the police station. 
7
.   The New Jersey statute provides in part: 
 
 2C:12-1.  Assault 
 
  a.  Simple Assault.  A person is guilty of 
assault if he: 
 
  (1) Attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly 
or recklessly causes bodily injury to 
another; 
 
   . . . . 
 
  b.  Aggravated Assault.  A person is guilty of 
aggravated assault if he: 
 
  . . . .  
 
  (5) Commits a simple assault as defined in 
subsection a. (1) . . . of this section upon 
 
   (a) Any law enforcement officer acting 
in the performance of his duties while 
in uniform or exhibiting evidence of his 
authority . . . . 
  
resisting arrest.9  Generally, the existence of probable cause is 
(..continued) 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-1(a), (b)(5)(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1994). 
8
.   The New Jersey statute provides: 
 
 2C:33-2.  Disorderly conduct 
 
  a.  Improper behavior.  A person is 
guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense, 
if with purpose to cause public 
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or 
recklessly creating a risk thereof he 
 
  (1) Engages in fighting or threatening, 
or in violent or tumultuous behavior; or 
 
  (2) Creates a hazardous or physically 
dangerous condition by any act which serves 
no legitimate purpose of the actor. 
 
  b. Offensive language.  A person is 
guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense 
if, in a public place, and with purpose to 
offend the sensibilities of a hearer or in 
reckless disregard of the probability of so 
doing, he addresses unreasonably loud and 
offensively coarse or abusive language, given 
the circumstances of the person present and 
the setting of the utterance, to any person 
present.   
 
  "Public" means affecting or likely to 
affect persons in a place to which the public 
or a substantial group has access; among the 
places included are highways, transport 
facilities, schools, prisons, apartment 
houses, places of business or amusement, or 
any neighborhood. 
 
Id. § 2C:33-2. 
9
.   The New Jersey statute provides in part: 
 
 2C:29-2.  Resisting arrest; eluding officer 
 
  a.  A person is guilty of a disorderly 
persons offense if he purposely prevents a 
  
a factual issue.  Deary v. Three Un-Named Police Officers, 746 
F.2d 185, 191 (3d Cir. 1984).  Summary judgment can be granted in 
an appropriate case on probable cause, id. at 192, but it is not 
proper here.  Because we find that a reasonable jury could find 
that the police did not have probable cause to arrest Groman, we 
reverse on this count as to police officer Helen K. Kirkland. 
 In order for the police to have properly arrested 
Groman, they must have had probable cause on the aggravated 
assault or disorderly conduct charges.  This is because the 
resisting arrest charge could not have provided probable cause 
for the arrest ab initio.  Additionally, should a jury decide 
that Groman did not hit Kirkland, it could determine that 
Kirkland lacked probable cause to arrest him on the aggravated 
assault charge.10  We are then left to consider the disorderly 
conduct charge. 
 A disorderly conduct charge under § 2C:33-2 requires 
that the behavior have been in "public."  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
2C:33-2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994).  In seeking to determine 
whether that element could be met here, we turn to New Jersey 
(..continued) 
law enforcement officer from effecting a 
lawful arrest . . . .  
 
Id. § 2C:29-2. 
10
.   This reasoning does not apply to officers Trembow and 
Vanderweil.  Summary judgment is appropriate as to them because 
the uncontested evidence demonstrates that Kirkland told each of 
them that Groman had punched her.  This is sufficient for them to 
have believed probable cause existed, and also insulates them 
from plaintiffs' claim of false imprisonment, Baker v. McCollan, 
443 U.S. 137, 143-44 (1979). 
  
case law.  In State v. Finate, 80 A.2d 341, 341 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. 1951), the police charged the first defendant with 
uttering "certain loud and offensive or indecent language from 
the [defendant's] yard," and the second defendant (his wife) with 
doing the same from her porch.  They were charged with violating 
an earlier version of the statute under which Groman was 
arrested.11  The court held the statute "indicates that a person 
cannot be charged with an offense thereunder while on his own 
property" and reversed the convictions.  Id. at 342. 
 The opinion in Finate, in conjunction with the current 
statutory text,12 leads us to conclude that Groman could not have 
committed the offense of disorderly conduct in his own home.13  
                     
11
.   The statute provided: 
 
 Loitering in public places or on private 
property; offensive language therein or 
thereon. 
 Any person who, being under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor, shall loiter in any 
public or quasi-public place, or in or upon 
any private property not his own within this 
state, or who, not being under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor, shall there indulge 
in and utter loud and offensive or indecent 
language, shall be adjudged a disorderly 
person. 
 
N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2:202-8 (1937). 
12
.   See supra note 8. 
13
.   Although New Jersey case law is sparse, case law from other 
jurisdictions supports this conclusion.  In Commonwealth v. 
Weiss, 490 A.2d 853 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), the court dealt with a 
statute very similar to this one.  The statute provided: 
 
 Disorderly conduct 
  
The police could not, therefore, have had probable cause to 
arrest him on that charge.  Since it is a jury question whether 
(..continued) 
  (a) Offense defined.--A person is guilty 
of disorderly conduct if, with intent to 
cause public inconvenience, annoyance or 
alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, 
he: 
  . . . . 
  (3) uses obscene language, or makes an 
obscene gesture; 
  . . . .  
  (c) Definition.--As used in this section 
the word "public" means affecting or likely 
to affect persons in a place to which the 
public or a substantial group has access; 
among the places included are highways, 
transport facilities, schools, prisons, 
apartment houses, places of business or 
amusement, any neighborhood, or any premises 
which are open to the public. 
 
(quoting 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5503(a)(3)).  In Weiss, the 
defendant had screamed epithets at the police officer who broke 
down her door to arrest her husband.  Id. at 854.  The court 
reversed defendant's conviction because the requirement that the 
conduct be in "public" was not satisfied.  Id. at 855-57. 
 
 Likewise, in People v. Jerome, 168 N.Y.S.2d 452 (County 
Ct. 1957), the court reversed defendant's conviction for cursing 
at a police officer from inside a private residence, holding that 
the private residence could not be a "public place" for purposes 
of the New York disorderly conduct statute.  Id. at 455.  In 
Whittington v. State, 634 N.E.2d 526 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), the 
defendant yelled at police officers who had gone to his house 
because of a report of a domestic disturbance there.  The 
defendant had apparently punched his sister.  Id. at 526.  The 
officers charged him with violating the disorderly conduct 
statute because of his verbal attacks on the officers, and he was 
convicted.  The court, in reversing his conviction, stressed that 
"[t]he forum employed by [defendant] was his own home.  Thus, the 
potential for invading the right of others to peace and quietude 
was diminished."  Id. at 527.  Even though the statute did not 
have the "public" element that the New Jersey law contains, the 
court reversed his conviction on the basis that his behavior was 
not sufficiently public.  Id. 
  
the police had probable cause to arrest Groman on the aggravated 
assault charge, and since the other two charges could not have 
provided probable cause for Groman's arrest, we will reverse the 
district court's grant of summary judgment on the false arrest 
claim as to police officer Kirkland. 
 A false imprisonment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is 
based on the Fourteenth Amendment protection against deprivations 
of liberty without due process of law.  Baker v. McCollan, 443 
U.S. 137, 142 (1979).  The Court in Baker made it clear an arrest 
based on probable cause could not become the source of a claim 
for false imprisonment.  Id. at 143-44.  On the other hand, where 
the police lack probable cause to make an arrest, the arrestee 
has a claim under § 1983 for false imprisonment based on a 
detention pursuant to that arrest.  Thomas v. Kippermann, 846 
F.2d 1009, 1011 (5th Cir. 1988).  A false imprisonment claim 
under § 1983 which is based on an arrest made without probable 
cause is grounded in the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against 
unreasonable seizures.  Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 
809, 820 (3d Cir. 1994); Guenther v. Holmgreen, 738 F.2d 879, 883 
(7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1212 (1985); Weber v. 
Village of Hanover Park, 768 F. Supp. 630, 634-36 (N.D. Ill. 
1991).  If the jury found in plaintiffs' favor on the false 
arrest claim, it could also find that Groman suffered a violation 
of his constitutional rights by virtue of his detention pursuant 
to that arrest.  See Pritchard v. Perry, 508 F.2d 423, 425 (4th 
Cir. 1975) (holding "[t]hat an infringement of personal liberty 
such as follows from an unconstitutional arrest has resulted in 
  
but a short period of restraint . . . manifestly cannot . . . 
abort an aggrieved plaintiff's right of action under Section 
1983.").  We will reverse the grant of summary judgment on the 
false imprisonment claim as to police officer Kirkland. 
 Plaintiffs also assert a claim under § 1983 based upon 
a failure to provide necessary medical treatment.  Failure to 
provide medical care to a person in custody can rise to the level 
of a constitutional violation under § 1983 only if that failure 
rises to the level of deliberate indifference to that person's 
serious medical needs.  Walmsley v. City of Phila., 872 F.2d 546, 
551-52 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989) (citing 
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)).  The record clearly 
establishes that the police offered Groman medical assistance 
which he consistently and obstinately rejected.  Defendants were 
not deliberately indifferent to Groman's medical needs. 
 Plaintiffs' three other claims against the police under 
§ 1983--unlawful search and seizure, conspiracy, and denial of 
right to counsel--may be disposed of briefly.  While plaintiffs 
raised the first two claims in their complaint, the district 
court properly observed that they have provided no factual basis 
upon which a reasonable jury could find in their favor.  Indeed, 
plaintiffs present these claims in the form of conclusory 
allegations, and a close review of the record reveals no factual 
basis upon which they could be sustained.  Accordingly, we will 
affirm the district court on these claims.  Finally, plaintiffs 
have not appealed the grant of summary judgment on the claim of a 
denial of the right to counsel. 
  
B.  Claim Against the Township of Manalapan   
 Plaintiffs urge us to sustain their cause of action 
against the Township of Manalapan under § 1983 for negligent 
supervision.  Plaintiffs recognize the Supreme Court in Monell v. 
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978), held 
a plaintiff must prove the existence of a policy or custom that 
has resulted in a constitutional violation in order to make a 
municipality liable under § 1983.  A municipality cannot be held 
liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.  Id. at 691.  
The Court has also stated that liability for failure to train 
subordinate officers will lie only where a constitutional 
violation results from "deliberate indifference to the 
constitutional rights of [the municipality's] inhabitants."  City 
of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989).  This 
deliberate indifference standard applies to plaintiffs' 
allegations of negligent supervision and failure to investigate.  
Cf. San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424, 445-46 (3d Cir. 
1994) (holding deliberate indifference standard applies to 
failure to investigate dismissal of an employee that may have 
been in violation of that employee's First Amendment rights), 
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 735 (1995).  Further, in Oklahoma City 
v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985), the Court held that "a 
single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to 
impose liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident 
includes proof that it was caused by an existing, 
unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed 
to a municipal policymaker."  See also Colburn v. Upper Darby 
  
Township, 838 F.2d 663, 672 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 
U.S. 1065 (1989) (holding allegations of three similar incidents 
enough to sustain a claim where a single incident presumably 
would not be). 
 It is clear that plaintiffs' claim against the 
municipality is unsubstantiated.  Plaintiffs assert two bases for 
their claim of liability based on municipal policy.  First, they 
make vague assertions about the police department's failure to 
investigate other wrongdoings, and second, they point to the 
incident in this case.  Plaintiffs' allegations about the 
Township's failure to investigate have virtually no evidentiary 
support in the record, and this case standing alone does not 
provide sufficient proof of a policy or custom to satisfy the 
dictates of § 1983.  Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823-24.  The record will 
not support a reasonable jury finding of a municipal policy or 
custom of "negligent supervision" which rises to the level of 
deliberate indifference required for § 1983 liability. 
C.  Claims Against the Englishtown-Manalapan First Aid Squad 
    and its Members 
 We turn now to plaintiffs' claims against defendants 
Englishtown-Manalapan First Aid Squad and squad members Edward T. 
Moriarty, Tracie Zachary, James Paulser, and Joseph Bokenko14 for 
                     
14
.   Plaintiffs also named paramedics from the Centra State 
Medical Center as defendants in their second amended complaint.  
Second Am. Compl. ¶ 1.  But the evidence fails to show that the 
Centra State paramedics had anything to do with the allegations 
in this case.  Further, as plaintiffs have failed to address the 
grant of summary judgment to these defendants on appeal, their 
claims are abandoned.  Travitz v. Northeast Dept. ILGWU Health & 
Welfare Fund, 13 F.3d 704, 711 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. 
Ct. 2165 (1994).  See also Simmons v. City of Phila., 947 F.2d 
  
conspiracy to violate constitutional rights and for failure to 
provide necessary medical treatment.  The first aid squad's 
involvement in the alleged conduct forming the basis of these 
claims was minimal. 
 The first aid squad attempted to treat Groman at his 
house and later at the police station.  Both times the police 
caused the squad to be dispatched.  It is uncontroverted that 
Groman adamantly refused the squad members' medical attention, 
although at the police station one squad member was able to take 
Groman's blood pressure.  Groman repeatedly and insistently 
called the squad members incompetent and rejected their medical 
attention at the police station even after they informed him he 
could go to the hospital even though he had been arrested.   
 As we have noted, a suit under § 1983 requires the 
wrongdoers to have violated federal rights of the plaintiff, and 
that they did so while acting under color of state law.  42 
U.S.C. § 1983.  As the "under color of state law" requirement is 
part of the prima facie case for § 1983, the plaintiff bears the 
burden of proof on that issue.  West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 
(1988).  The color of state law element is a threshold issue; 
there is no liability under § 1983 for those not acting under 
color of law.  Versarge v. Township of Clinton, N.J., 984 F.2d 
1359, 1363 (3d Cir. 1993). 
(..continued) 
1042, 1065-66 (3d Cir. 1991) (observing a mere passing reference 
is insufficient to bring an issue before the court on appeal), 
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1671 (1992). 
  
 Where the actors are not state or municipal officials, 
but are private individuals or associations, we still must 
address whether their activity can nevertheless be deemed to be 
under color of law.  The inquiry is fact-specific.  Lugar v. 
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982); Krynicky v. 
University of Pittsburgh, 742 F.2d 94, 97-98 (3d Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1015 (1985).  The first aid squad's 
relationship to the Township therefore is crucial to our analysis 
under § 1983.  The first aid squad members here were not employed 
by the Township.  They were volunteers, and the squad itself was 
a private organization.  The first aid squad received at least 
$25,000 annually from the Township, but it is not clear how much 
of the squad's total budget this amount comprised, nor what, if 
any, oversight the Township exercised over the squad's 
operations.  Defendants' unrebutted assertion is that the first 
aid squad received no health benefits or insurance coverage from 
either Manalapan or Englishtown and that the squad was not under 
the formal direction or control of either municipality. 
  
 The color of state law15 analysis can be difficult, but 
is grounded in a basic and clear requirement, "that the defendant 
in a § 1983 action have exercised power 'possessed by virtue of 
state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed 
with the authority of state law.'"  West, 487 U.S. at 49 (quoting 
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).  A private 
action is not converted into one under color of state law merely 
by some tenuous connection to state action.  The issue is not 
whether the state was involved in some way in the relevant 
events, but whether the action taken can be fairly attributed to 
the state itself.  Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 
345, 351 (1974).  As the Supreme Court has stated: "we ask 
whether the State provided a mantle of authority that enhanced 
the power of the harm-causing individual actor."  NCAA v. 
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192 (1988). 
 Supreme Court jurisprudence outlines several approaches 
or discrete tests for detecting the presence of action under 
color of state law.16  The tests have included the exclusive 
                     
15
.   The "under color of state law" inquiry under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 and the "state action" requirement under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution are identical in most 
contexts.  Robison v. Canterbury Village, Inc., 848 F.2d 424, 427 
n.3 (3d Cir. 1988).  Conduct satisfying the state action 
requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment will satisfy the § 
1983 requirement as well, but the reverse is not necessarily 
true.  Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 n.18 (1982).  
For convenience we will use the terms interchangeably.  
16
.  We note initially that, as one commentator has observed: 
 
  Imposing categories and labels on the 
Court's different approaches to state action 
issues is somewhat arbitrary and potentially 
  
government function approach, see Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 
436 U.S. 149, 157-58 (1978), the joint participation or symbiotic 
relationship approach, see Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 
842 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1010-11 (1982), and 
the nexus approach, see Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351.17 
(..continued) 
misleading.  The Court seldom describes its 
decisions as creating a structure of discrete 
state action theories.  Rather, the Court's 
decisions follow the more traditional 
judicial style of deciding each case based on 
the facts of the case, guided by similarly 
fact-specific decisions of the past.  In 
addition, the Court uses different phrases to 
refer to the same or similar theories. . . .  
Nonetheless, the Court's state action 
decisions do create some clearly 
distinguishable approaches to the state 
action issue. 
 
Henry C. Strickland, The State Action Doctrine and the Rehnquist 
Court, 18 Hastings Const. L.Q. 587, 596-97 (1991) (citations 
omitted).  We also observe that lower courts have routinely 
treated the state action inquiry as including several discrete 
tests.  See, e.g., McKeesport Hosp. v. Accreditation Council, 24 
F.3d 519, 524 (3d Cir. 1994); Conner v. Donnelly, 42 F.3d 220, 
223-24 (4th Cir. 1994); Sherman v. Consolidated Sch. Dist. 21, 8 
F.3d 1160, 1168 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2109 
(1994); Lopez v. Department of Health Serv., 939 F.2d 881, 883 
(9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam); Yeager v. City of McGregor, 980 
F.2d 337, 339 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 79 (1993). 
17
.  Although the Supreme Court's recent pronouncement on the 
state action inquiry in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 
U.S. 614 (1991), does not explicitly restate these approaches, it 
does refer approvingly to past state action jurisprudence and 
cites favorably to its own precedent, including Lugar in which 
the Court had observed: 
 
 [That] which would convert [a] private party 
into a state actor might vary with the 
circumstances of the case. . . . [T]he Court 
has articulated a number of different factors 
or tests in different contexts . . . .  
Whether these different tests are actually 
different in operation or simply different 
  
(..continued) 
ways of characterizing the necessarily fact-
bound inquiry that confronts the Court in 
such a situation need not be resolved here. 
 
Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939.  After citing favorably to Lugar, the 
Edmonson Court noted: 
 
 [O]ur cases disclose certain principles of 
general application.  Our precedents 
establish that, in determining whether a 
particular action or course of conduct is 
governmental in character, it is relevant to 
examine the following: the extent to which 
the actor relies on governmental assistance 
and benefits; whether the actor is performing 
a traditional governmental function; and 
whether the injury caused is aggravated in a 
unique way by the incidents of governmental 
authority.  Based on our application of these 
three principles to the circumstances here, 
we hold that the exercise of peremptory 
challenges by the defendant in the District 
Court was pursuant to a course of state 
action. 
 
Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 621-22 (citations omitted).  We and other 
circuits have not read this passage as necessarily mandating one 
specific method of performing the state action inquiry.  See 
McKeesport Hosp., 24 F.3d at 524; Connor, 42 F.3d at 223-24; 
Sherman, 8 F.3d at 1168; Lopez, 939 F.2d at 883; Yeager, 980 F.2d 
at 339.  The opinion in Edmonson appears neither to restrict 
courts to one specific approach nor to foreclose them from 
employing various approaches as warranted by the particular 
circumstances of the cases before them.  The state action inquiry 
is "necessarily fact-bound," Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939, and the 
approach a court uses to conduct that inquiry should likewise be 
tailored to the facts of the case before it.   
 
 But any approach a court uses must remain focused on 
the heart of the state action inquiry, which, as we noted above, 
is to discern if the defendant "exercised power 'possessed by 
virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer 
is clothed with the authority of state law.'"  West v. Atkins, 
487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 
U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).  Edmonson emphasized the importance of 
this inquiry.  500 U.S. at 620. 
  
 Plaintiffs assert the first aid squad was performing an 
exclusive government function in its treatment of Groman.  The 
Supreme Court has made clear that the scope of exclusive 
government functions is limited, reaching only those activities 
that have been "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the 
State."  Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842 (quoting Jackson, 419 
U.S. at 353).  See also Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 158 (stating 
"[w]hile many functions have been traditionally performed by 
governments, very few have been 'exclusively reserved to the 
State'"); cf. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966) (holding 
"when private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with 
powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies 
or instrumentalities of the State and subject to its 
constitutional limitations").18 
                     
18
.  Although the Supreme Court in Edmonson framed the inquiry as 
the "traditional government function" inquiry, 500 U.S. at 621, 
rather than as the "exclusive government function" test, the 
Court also held "[t]he selection of jurors represents a unique 
governmental function . . . ."  Id. at 627 (emphasis added).  The 
word "unique" in this context appears synonymous with 
"exclusive," and thus it seems probable the Court did not intend 
to alter the test for all purposes but rather to permit different 
analyses depending on the circumstances.  Most appellate cases 
are in accord with this reading.  We note especially the opinion 
in UAW, Local 5285 v. Gaston Festivals, Inc., No. 94-1387, 1995 
WL 7677, at *9 n.2 (4th Cir. Jan. 10, 1995), in which the court 
declined to read the Edmonson Court's odd omission of the 
"exclusivity" requirement as adopting a new test.  The court 
observed:  
 
 The Court in Edmonson seemed to ignore the 
"exclusivity" requirement of the 
"traditionally exclusive government function" 
test, Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 621, 624-28, and 
was criticized by the dissent for having 
"misstated the law," see id. at 639 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).  The Court's 
  
 In the course of enunciating the contours of what 
constitutes an exclusive government function, the Supreme Court 
(..continued) 
omission of this requirement raises a 
question as to whether the standard still 
includes such a requirement.  See, e.g., 
McKeesport Hospital v. Accreditation Council, 
24 F.3d 519, 528 (3d Cir. 1994) (Becker, J., 
concurring).  However, we do not believe the 
Supreme Court would have attempted to change 
radically the government function standard 
set forth in Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353, and 
thereafter applied consistently in Flagg 
Bros., 436 U.S. at 157-58, Rendell-Baker, 457 
U.S. at 842, Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 
1005, 1011-12 (1982), [San Francisco Arts & 
Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic 
Committee], 483 U.S. [522,] 544-45 (1987), 
and NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 197-98 
n.18 (1988), through the transparent 
puerilism of simple omission.  If it had 
intended to change the law in this respect, 
we believe it would have said so explicitly.  
Moreover, the ultimate reasoning of the Court 
in Edmonson was that juror selection was 
traditionally an exclusive governmental 
function.  See, e.g., Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 
627 ("The selection of jurors represents a 
unique governmental function delegated to 
private litigants by the government and 
attributable to the government . . . .").  
Accordingly, we proceed on the understanding 
that the "exclusivity" requirement must be 
satisfied. 
 
Gaston Festivals, 1995 WL 7677, at *9 n.2 (emphasis omitted); see 
also McKeesport Hosp., 24 F.3d at 524; Black by Black v. Indiana 
Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707, 710-11 (3d Cir. 1993); Andrews v. 
Federal Home Loan Bank, 998 F.2d 214, 217 (4th Cir. 1993); 
Yeager, 980 F.2d at 340.  But cf. Sherman, 8 F.3d at 1169 
(formulating the inquiry as one into the existence of a 
"traditional state function," but also citing to Flagg Bros. Inc. 
v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158 (1978), where the Supreme Court 
stated: "While many functions have been traditionally performed 
by governments, very few have been 'exclusively reserved to the 
State'").   
  
has held that receipt of public funds and the performance of a 
function serving the public alone are not enough to make a 
private entity a state actor.  Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840, 
842.  Our decision in Black by Black v. Indiana Area School 
District, 985 F.2d 707, 710-11 (3d Cir. 1993), follows Rendell-
Baker and holds a school bus driver is not performing an 
exclusive government function even though paid by the state and 
performing a service for the public.  Plaintiffs' reliance then 
on two factors--public funding and service to the public--is by 
itself insufficient, and plaintiffs have presented no other 
evidence which might persuade us that the first aid squad here 
was performing an exclusive government function. 
  Plaintiffs also urge us to follow by analogy a decision 
from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that held a 
volunteer fire company to be an exclusive government actor.  
Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dep't, 607 F.2d 17 (2d 
Cir. 1979).  But Janusaitis predates the seminal cases Rendell-
Baker and Blum, and its holding is ambiguously grounded in both 
the exclusive government function and the symbiotic relationship 
tests.  Janusaitis, 607 F.2d at 23.  Recently, the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached a contrary result to 
Janusaitis in Yeager v. City of McGregor, 980 F.2d 337, 343 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 79 (1993).  The Yeager court 
found the volunteer fire company did not serve an exclusive 
government function on two grounds: first, since Texas law 
allowed but did not compel the city to establish a fire 
department it could hardly be called an exclusive government 
  
function; and second, it took "judicial notice of the fact that 
there are a variety of private sector fire fighting alternatives; 
and fire fighting is not generally an exclusive government 
function."  Id. at 340-41 (footnotes omitted).  The court also 
observed that the state action determination was important to the 
extent it helps protect voluntary organizations from needless 
lawsuits.  Id. at 339. 
 While there are similarities between volunteer fire 
departments and volunteer first aid squads, there are sufficient 
differences that may counsel against adopting this analogy.  
First aid squads perform different functions from fire 
departments.19  To the extent we do find similarities, we find 
the court's analysis in Yeager more persuasive than the court's 
in Janusaitis and more consonant with controlling precedent, 
                     
19
.   Among other differences, first aid squads usually render 
assistance when they have a person's actual or implied consent.  
First aid squad member Moriarty's testimony demonstrates that the 
squad members were aware of that consensual relationship: 
 
 Q: Why did you elect not to treat Mr. Groman, 
even over his objection, whether verbal or 
physical? 
 
 A: Part of the treatment would be to 
transport the patient; and if I were to 
transport the patient without his consent, it 
would be kidnaping. 
  We cannot force anybody to be treated.  
We can recommend, for their good and welfare, 
that they allow us to treat them, but we 
cannot force them to allow us to treat them.  
That's why I elected to obtain or attempted 
to obtain a medical release. 
 
Moriarty Dep., Defendant's App. at 51-52. 
  
although we do not explicitly adopt the analysis in Yeager.  We 
must keep in mind the Supreme Court's admonition to pay close 
attention to the facts of each case while conducting the state 
action inquiry.  Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939.  Accordingly, we cannot 
accept Groman's contention that a volunteer first aid squad would 
be deemed to perform an exclusive government function merely 
because a volunteer fire department had been held to perform one.  
We find plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of 
demonstrating the first aid squad here was performing an 
exclusive government function. 
 Plaintiffs' other theories to ground a finding of state 
action can be analyzed under a general conceptual inquiry, in 
which we seek to ascertain "the degree to which the state and the 
[private] entity exist in a 'symbiotic relationship' or under 
circumstances where the conduct of the private actor can be 
fairly imputed as that of the state."  Yeager, 980 F.2d at 342 
(citing Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351; San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 
Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 556 (1987)).  
The Supreme Court has frequently discussed the boundaries of this 
branch of the state action doctrine.  In Rendell-Baker, the 
Supreme Court held a private school which was carrying out a 
state-sponsored program and which received at least ninety 
percent of its funds from the state was nevertheless not a state 
actor.  457 U.S. at 840-43.  In Blum, the Court held private 
nursing homes were not state actors even though they were 
extensively funded and regulated by the state.  457 U.S. at 1011-
12.  While the exact contours of this state action inquiry are 
  
difficult to delineate, the interdependence between the state and 
private actor must be pronounced before the law will transform 
the private actor into a state actor.  See id. at 1004; Boyle v. 
Governor's Veterans Outreach & Assistance Ctr., 925 F.2d 71, 76 
(3d Cir. 1991).  The first aid squad, though financially assisted 
by the Township and (we assume here) functioning as support to 
the police, nevertheless did not have its professional decisions 
dictated or guided by the state.  There is no evidence that the 
Township controlled the first aid squad's professional conduct.  
See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981). 
 Given the relationship between the first aid squad and 
the Township here, we find no symbiotic relationship, joint 
participation, or other connection sufficient to demonstrate the 
first aid squad was acting under color of state law.  Neither the 
squad's receipt of public funds, nor the police's request for the 
first aid squad, nor Groman's status as a person in custody at 
the time of the squad's second response is enough to create state 
action on the part of the first aid squad.  Even if the events 
created an affirmative obligation under the Due Process Clause 
for the police to provide medical care, City of Revere v. 
Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244-45 (1983), this 
obligation did not transform the first aid squad into a state 
actor.  As we have held, the police fulfilled their 
constitutional obligation by calling the first aid squad, and the 
first aid squad's actions do not make them state actors for 
purposes of § 1983.  
  
 Accordingly, we will affirm the district court's grant 
of summary judgment on plaintiffs' claims against the 
Englishtown-Manalapan First Aid Squad, Edward T. Moriarty, Tracie 
Zachary, James Paulser, and Joseph Bokenko.  Although our 
disposition of the color of state law requirement makes it 
unnecessary for us to reach the issue of whether plaintiffs have 
a colorable claim of a violation of federal rights by the first 
aid squad and its members, we are compelled to note that the 
record contains no evidence of a valid claim.   
 
 IV. 
 We will reverse the district court's grant of summary 
judgment on plaintiffs' claim of excessive force under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 as to officers Kirkland, Trembow, and Vanderweil, and on 
plaintiffs' false arrest and false imprisonment claims against 
officer Kirkland.  We will remand these claims to the district 
court.  We will affirm the district court's grant of summary 
judgment on all other federal claims.  The district court 
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' 
state law tort claims because it found no cognizable federal 
claim.  We will vacate that portion of the district court's order 
so it can determine whether to hear the state claims along with 
the federal claims.  
